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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.

"LEX AEQUITATE GAUDET."

"Sometimes strange things transcend out wonted theme." Such is
the doctrine declared, or at least repeated, in a decision handed down,
upon January 8th, 1914, by the Court of Appeals, reported in 156 Ky.
717, entitled Gahren, Dodge & Maltby vs. Farmers Bank of Estill County.
This doctrine, while not a new one, yet seems to have been given an
added force by the principle there enunciated. It appears from the
petition in that case that "on October 22nd, 1912, at the special instance
and request of both the defendants, plaintiff loaned to them the sum of
$5000, which amount they each both jointly and severally agreed to pay
plaintiff," etc. For answer "defendant denies than on October 22nd,
1912, plaintiff loaned to defendant the sum of $5000."
There are some other points involved in the case. But it is the
question of the sufficiency of such. an answer to such an allegation; of
the necessity for the addition of the words "or any other sum"; and the
construction of such denial to admit the loan "on some other day," of a
sum "slightly less than $5000," that this article shall treat.
The foundation of the jurisprudence of Virginia was in the technicalities and formalities of the Common Law system of pleading. Kentucky is a child of Virginia, and her's is an offspring of Virginia's
jurisprudence. Under the original pleading in Virginia all the common
law technicalities and technical forms obtained. When Kentucky was
formed from a part of Virginia she retained all those technicalities and
formalities of her mother state. But these were changed by statutory
enactment, and a Code of Practice was adopted which was to liberalize
pleading and abolish all technical forms and words and rid the practice
of cumbersome technical objections. See. 88 of the Civil Code expressly
so declares. The law now follows, it seems, the more equitable principle
and maxim that it is the substance and not the form which prevails. In
other words, if A, attempt to lay a cause of action in certain technical
terms, but failing, sufficiently makes known to the Court what constitutes
his cause of action, if that cause of action is good, then he will remain
in Court. Quae cum omnibus semper una atque eadem voce loquerentur
leges inventae sunt. The law is no respecter of persons, so if B. comes
in and attempts to, but fails to answer in technical form or words, yet
if he sufficiently state a good defense in substance--for it is the substance
which must govern-then it is none the less a sufficient answer. It is
not incumbent upon B. to deny more than A. has alleged. The Code
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only requires that the defendant shall deny every material allegation.
Any attempt to deny more would be to allege and put into issue for the
plaintiff, what he did not choose to allege for himself,-or even that
which might not exist at all. It is presumed that A. following the
requirements of the Code alleges everything material to his cause that he
can allege. For B. to deny more would only be to place himself in
hazard.
For example, A. alleges in his petition that "B. executed to him
his note for $5000, due October 22nd, 1912," etc. To which allegation
comes B. and answers that he "denies that he executed to A. his note for
$5000, due October 22nd, 1912," etc.
It is required of the plaintiff that he shall state in his petition, in
ordinary and concise language, the facts constituting the cause of his
action, and every fact necessary to enable plaintiff to recover must be
alleged * * * The facts must be so alleged as to enable the opposite
party to know what is meant to be proved, and also that an issue may
be formed in regard to the subject matter in dispute, and to enable the
court to pronounce the law, etc. Lou. & Portland Canal Co. vs. Murphy
9 Bush 522, 527, and Civil Code Sec. 90.
This principle is well settled. It is incumbent upon plaintiff to state
all the facts constituting the cause of action upon which he seeks to
recover judgment. The facts are all within his knowledge. The particular facts of that cause may not be within the knowledge of any other
person; possibly plaintiff himself may only imagine them. It is his
duty to disclose all those he relies upon; his duty to the Court "that the
Court may pronounce the law applicable"; his duty to the defendant
that he may be warned of that upon which plaintiff founds his cause
of action, that he may know what to deny and what course to pursue
to defend that particular action. When the plaintiff shall have stated
his cause, then if they are proven or admitted he shall prevail. Otherwise he cannot recover. But, it will be said, if A. shall allege that B. owes
him $5000, and shall fail to prove that allegation, yet if he prove that
B. owes him any sum within that amount he shall recover the amount
so proven. In other words, an allegation of $5000 will be presumed to
cover any lesser amount that may be proven. Let us grant that. The
law holds the plaintiff and defendant in exactly the same light. Whatever of presumption is indulged for the one, must be indulged for the
other . If there be a presumption in plaintiff's favor giving a greater
meaning to his allegation than the words naturally convey, then shall
not there be an equal presumption in the favor of defendant that the
denial or answer of defendant shall be presumed to have an equal breadth
of meaninz? Shall the identical words when in the mouth of ulaintiff
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have an implied meaning that when in the mouth of defendant is not
implied by them, or imputed to them; Lex aequitate gaudet. Then if
to that allegation B. deny that he owes A. $5000 shall B. fail? Or shall
the same meaning be imputed to his answer as that imputed to the
petition of A. and his answer be so construed that it shall deny owing
$5000, and as well, each and every conceivable amount "slightly less
than $5000?"
For the Court to hold otherwise is to relieve A. of the burden of
proving what he has alleged, and of what B. has denied, in haec verba
It is presumed that A., in good faith, alleges all the facts upon which
he relies. He tenders the issue. B. accepts A.'s tender, and denies the
allegations in haec verba. Then the burden should be upon A. to prove
his allegation. Sec. 526 of the Civil Code provides that the burden lies
on that party who would be defeated if no evidence were offered. Shall
the denial by B. of the fact alleged by A. be an admission of every fact
of "slightly less," or any less consequence, contained within the bounds
of that allegation? Shall there be a presumption in such a case that A.
was in error in his allegation, and that B. does owe him "a sum slightly
less," $4999.99, or a presumption that he owes him any sum at all other
than what he has alleged? Shall A. not only be relieved of the burden
of proving his allegation that B. owes him $5000, no more, no less, but
shall even the answer denying in haec verba that allegation, be so
construed against B. as actually to "admit some other sum slightly less;'
e. g., $4999.99, or to admit any sum; or the same sum upon "some other
day ?" A. did not allege "or any other sum," he did not allege the same
sum due upon "some other day." B. has denied exactly what A. has
alleged.
By what process of reason can it be said that B. must deny more
than A. alleges, under penalty that if he does not so deny, i. e., if he
deny in haec verba, the result shall be that the denial is incomplete, that
A. can by his own misleading allegation, so lay his cause of action that
B. cannot deny more, and then take advantage of him because he cannot
and does not? It is quite possible to conceive of circumstances under
which B. cannot deny that he owes A. a sum certain "or any other sum,"
due upon a date certain, "or any other date": that because of some other
transaction between them B. may owe A. some other sum due on some
other day. Suppose, for instance, the following: Upon July 1st, 1912,
B. promised to pay A. the sum of $4999. During January, 1912, A sues
B., falsely alleging that B. promised to pay him $5000 upon January
1st., 1912. B. answers in haec verba that he "denies that he promised
to pay A. the sum of $5000 upon January 1st, 1912." Under the decision
in the case under discussion, B. isadmitting that he did promise on some

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL.

17

other day to pay some other sum. Suppose that under that admission
judgment is entered for A. in the sum of $4999, a "sum slightly less."
Does this judgment satisfy the debt due on July 1st, 1912 for that
amount, $4999 ? Assuredly not, for that debt was not yet due. Then
what debt does it satisfy, for no debt existed? B. could not deny owing
A. some other sum due at some other time. Yet according to the decision
Gahren, Maltby & Dodge v. Bank &c., without such denial, A. can mulct
B. of any sum less than the amount denied. And the other and real
debt remains.
Should such a position be sustained or should the presumption
indulged to plaintiff that his allegation of $5000 covers every conceivable
amount "slightly less," or at all less, than $5000, be equally invoked for
defendant, and his denial of that specific amount or at all less, thereby
securing to each party that equality in which the law delights? Is it
reasonable to hold otherwise? Surely we must be reasonable, for "Lex
est ratio summa." Ex-president Taft once said, and well, that "We must
keep law and justice together in order to justify the law."

